This week, the Texas Supreme Court chose four more petitions for its fall argument calendar. (orders list).
Shared discovery orders and litigation involving trade secrets
, No. 12-0124
The dispute is over the scope of a protective order for the defendant’s trade secrets. The wrinkle is that the order permits limited sharing with other qualifying litigants beyond this case — so similar plaintiffs in another state might obtain this information and might, in turn, share discovery information that they have gathered. The defendant argues that this is an abuse of discretion and constitutes a taking. The plaintiff side argues that these shared discovery orders are commonly permitted in other jurisdictions and promote judicial efficiency while adequately protecting the producing party.
Expert certifications to sue architects, engineers, and surveyors
, No. 12-0251
Chapter 150 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code requires those suing architects, engineers, or surveyors to include a certification about the claim from a qualified expert with the original filing or risk dismissal. Here, the two sides reached a Rule 11 agreement about expert deadlines that might extend this time. Before that (new) deadline was reached but after the underlying statute of limitations on the claim had expired, the defendant moved to dismiss under section 150.002. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the case did not qualify for a “good cause” extension under the statute. Justice Keyes dissented, arguing that the defendant had waived this right through the Rule 11 agreement.
The petition argues, among other things, that the court of appeals lacked interlocutory appellate jurisdiction over a trial court decision to extend time (rather than to dismiss) and that the Rule 11 agreement should be enforced.
ERISA preemption of severance agreements
, No. 12-0360
The case asks if a group of employees of a company that sold a business unit to another company had, on these facts, a contract claim against their former employer over severance benefits. At the court of appeals level, the three-judge panel split three ways:
- an opinion conveying the judgment, which concluded that the claims were not preempted by ERISA but that these facts did not demonstrate any contract breach;
a concurring opinion in the judgment only, which concluded that this claim was preempted by ERISA; and
a dissenting opinion, which concluded the claim was not preempted and that these facts were consistent with a contract claim.
Suits by insurers to recover funds paid out by mistake of fact (with some appellate twists)
, No. 12-0452
This appeal involves a complex tangle of insurance obligations for an oilfield blowout in 1997. The petition is brought by the insurer, seeking to recover some funds previously paid out to certain parties involved in the operation. The petition claims that the payments were made “under a mistake of fact” and seeks restitution from those who ultimately received the funds. The respondents argue that this is an extra-contractual claim that is barred by Excess Underwriters at Lloyd’s v. Frank’s Casing Crew & Rental Tools, 246 S.W.3d 42 (Tex. 2008).
One argument made involves “law of the case.” This case has percolated up and down the appellate chain, with two previous decisions of the court of appeals (Gotham I and Gotham II) resulting in petition denials. The petition argues that the appellate decision below (called Gotham III in the briefing) violated the law-of-the-case doctrine by reversing field on a legal point because of the intervening Frank’s Casing decision.
That points toward an even more arcane lurking issue — how does “law of the case” work in a case that has been transferred by docket equalization? Under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 41.3, “the court of appeals to which the case is transferred must decide the case in accordance with the precedent of the transferor court under principles of stare decisis…” The Gotham III version of this appeal was sent from the San Antonio Court to the El Paso Court. It was that transferee court that set aside the San Antonio Court’s holding in Gotham I. If Frank’s Casing represented such a sharp break with the prior law that even the San Antonio Court would have been required to change its result, then the decision seems consistent with both Rule 41.3 and “law of the case.” But if Frank’s Casing did not change the principle upon which Gotham I rested, does Rule 41.3 prevent a transferee court from revisiting the issue?
This last question might be turn out to be academic. The Texas Supreme Court itself is not bound by the law-of-the-case doctrine in regard to the substance of this appeal, because its prior petition denial does not have the effect of blessing the result of Gotham I on the merits. But how the Court’s opinion juggles these doctrines may give some guidance to litigants and judges who dealing with the kind of blockbuster cases that tend to spin off a whole series of appellate sequels.